> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.icme.io/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.icme.io/documentation/use-cases/agentic-commerce.md).

# AGENTIC COMMERCE

Agentic commerce is commerce where the buyer, the seller, or both are AI agents acting on someone's behalf. An agent finds a vendor, negotiates terms, approves a price, signs a transaction, and settles payment, all without a human clicking confirm on each step.

This is no longer hypothetical. Agents hold wallet keys, run x402 stablecoin transfers, carry payment credentials, and check out on live storefronts.

***

### Why it matters

Every existing commerce trust model assumes a human is somewhere in the loop. Agentic commerce removes that assumption, and three problems surface immediately.

**Speed removes the human check.** An agent can complete a purchase, a transfer, or a refund faster than anyone can review it. Approval after the fact is not approval.

**Both parties are strangers.** When two agents transact, neither controls the other's stack. A seller agent has no way to know a buyer agent respected its spending limits. Asking it to trust a log file is not a security model.

**The attack surface is language.** Cart hijacking, fake merchants, and injected instructions in product listings all target the agent's judgment. A guardrail that also relies on model judgment can be argued out of enforcing the rule. The same channel carries both the attack and the defense.

The result is a gap: real value moving at machine speed with no enforceable, checkable constraint on it.

***

### How PreFlight closes the gap

PreFlight compiles your policy into formal logic and checks each proposed action with a solver before it executes. `SAT` proceeds, `UNSAT` is blocked. Every decision produces a zero-knowledge proof receipt.

For agentic commerce, the proof is the part that matters. A counterparty can verify that your agent's action passed policy without re-running the check, trusting your infrastructure, or seeing your policy. That makes trustless agent-to-agent settlement possible.

The pages below cover where this applies: wallets and treasuries, settlement and payment rails, and the attacks aimed at shopping agents.